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It might sound rather convincing to assume that we owe the pleasure of reading the novel 
form to our elemental repository of physical perception, to our feelings. This would be 
true only if mere feelings could add up to something more than just emotions, to some deep 
understanding of the human. After all, a moment of epiphany, where we begin to realize 
things that dramatically disturb our normal state of mind, is not just emotional, nor indeed a 
simple moment. Despite its root in the corporeal, a mo(ve)ment of affective realization reaches 
beyond the realm of the human and opens up the plane of virtual potentials. In this work, we 
intend to map out the points and relations of affective singularity that pervade the narrative 
of Toni Morrison’s Sula (1973). Also, we will discuss how these mo(ve)ments of sensation give 
form to Sula’s and Nel’s experiences and contribute to an affective transformation in morality 
and friendship.
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. . .
Una lectura de la amistad y la moralidad en Sula de Toni Morrison bajo 
el prisma de Deleuze y Guattari. La afectividad a debate
Podría resultar convincente asumir que el placer de leer formas novelísticas está relacionado 
con nuestro repositorio de percepciones físicas, con nuestros sentimientos. Este aserto sólo 
podría ser cierto si tales sentimientos nos llevasen más allá de las emociones hacia una 
comprensión más profunda de lo humano. En realidad, el momento epifánico en que se nos 
revelan las situaciones que perturban de forma radical nuestros estados mentales normales 
no es un solo momento, ni es tampoco puramente emocional. Pese a estar enraizado en lo 
corpóreo, cualquier mo(vi)m(i)ento de comprensión de la afectividad va más allá del ámbito 
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de lo humano para abrirse a un ámbito mayor de posibilidades. En este trabajo queremos 
explorar aquellos aspectos de la singularidad afectiva que impregnan la novela Sula (1973) de 
Toni Morrison. Además, se estudiará el modo cómo los distintos mo(vi)m(i)entos de emoción 
en la novela dan forma a las experiencias de sus protagonistas, Sula y Nel, y contribuyen a su 
transformación afectiva en términos morales y de amistad.
Palabras clave: Gilles Deleuze; Felix Guattari; Toni Morrison; Sula; afectividad/afectos; 
emociones
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1. Introduction
Novels are a great form, if not the greatest, to deal with human characters, explore 
human life, provide solutions to human problems, even problematize human solutions. 
What else could the novel relate to if not to the human? We wish here to enumerate 
three of the various dimensions that account for the humanness of any human character 
in a novel, namely, experience, belief and emotion. Although it would be too inflated 
a claim to posit that these elements are exclusive to human beings, we are positive 
that the experience-belief-emotion triad forms an infinite range of possibilities that 
no other beings can rival in complexity. Take Madame Bovary, Mrs. Dalloway, Jude, 
Gatsby, Lady Chatterley. When we remember the great characters of the novel, it is for 
their encounters, judgments and feelings—however eccentric, flawed, involuted, vain 
or abject the character might be. A character’s belief, judgment, attitude, supposition 
or mindset can be said to take shape in the encounter between experience and emotion, 
just as a character’s emotion is the result of an encounter between experience and 
judgment, attitude, belief. Experience, however, is directly connected with the outside, 
with happenings and incidents. 
Gilles Deleuze utilizes the term experience/impression not in the laboratory 
sense—that is, as a valid source of objective knowledge that establishes itself through 
the scientific method—but as the process through which an individual’s cognition/
perception engages in an involuntary encounter with the world outside. The 
experiencing individual, as a result, senses the urge/necessity to interpret/decipher the 
sign(s) emitted by “a substance, an object, a being” (Deleuze [1964] 2000, 4). Deleuze 
considers that the act of interpretation/reading moves beyond the limits of “strictly 
intellectual truths [insofar as] they lack ‘necessity.’ But in art or in literature, when 
intelligence supervenes, it is always after, not before: ‘The impression is for the writer 
what experimentation is for the scientist, with this difference, that in the scientist the 
work of the intelligence proceeds and in the writer comes after’” (23; emphasis in the 
original). According to Alan Bourassa, “[t]he human character in the novel is the result 
of a certain set of experiences, both expected and unexpected. [In fact,] a character 
is the sum total of its experiences” (2009, 11-13). Thus, it is not until something 
happens that a character can gain experience, understanding, awareness. In this sense, 
experience is accumulative; it is what gives depth to the character by making change 
and transformation inevitable. 
Now that we are entangled in the experience-belief-emotion triad, let us pose some 
questions as a way out. What advantage is there in the novel that distinguishes it from 
the myriad of other sources, other forms of knowledge that similarly stake a claim 
to a definition of the human? A quick but shallow answer would be that readers can 
grasp such insight, such awareness through sympathy, by responding emotionally. But 
what is the point of reading—or writing for that matter—more and more novels if we 
can have that understanding from our encounter with our first novel(s)? And, what, 
then, is the point of reading critically or practicing literary criticism? After all, not 
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all novels have that charge of insight to give a reader the ultimate sensation, the sharp 
feeling that perhaps one has made a once-in-a-lifetime discovery. We will argue that 
the novel provides for us the much appreciated opportunity to draw lines of flight, to 
move beyond the human and open ourselves up to the realm of virtual potentials, to 
the nonhuman. To this end, we will draw on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s theory 
of affect as a virtual, nonhuman reality that actualizes into, is constitutive of and is 
differentiated from human emotions ([1991] 1994). In addition, we will develop two 
instances of problematic, two networks of singular mo(ve)ments for Toni Morrison’s 
Sula ([1973] 2004): one, based on the synthesis of emotions—we will see how this 
problematic fails to take us beyond the human—and another, based on the synthesis 
of affects—the problematic that will draw a line of flight and open up the realm of the 
virtual. However, before discussing the novel in terms of a problematic, we will offer a 
brief narrative and contextual sketch of Sula.
2. Text and Context
In Sula, Toni Morrison follows the life—and death—of her title character from 1919 to 
1965 with a ten-year interval in the middle that divides the novel into two parts. The 
first part of the novel outlines Sula’s childhood friendship with her one great companion 
and only true friend Nel. They live in a fictional place called the Bottom, a hilly part 
of the town of Medallion, which was given as a token of freedom by a white farmer 
to his slave. Although the land is not fertile, the slave is tricked into believing that 
the Bottom is so called because it is the first place that God sees when he looks down 
from heaven (Morrison [1973] 2004, 5). The appellation suggests that the African 
American inhabitants of the Bottom are still subject to racial oppression even after 
regaining their—nominal—freedom. Following Nel’s marriage to Jude Greene, Sula 
feels dejected and leaves town. The second part of the novel begins when Sula returns to 
Medallion only to find out that she is seen as evil incarnate by the townspeople because 
of her disregard for conventional moral codes. Sula sleeps with Nel’s husband, which 
causes a rift between Jude and Nel and between the two friends. It is only after Sula’s 
death that Nel, who is haunted by a lingering sense of grief up until the novel’s end, 
reconstructs her spiritual connection with her childhood friend.
Male characters are often absent in the Bottom community. The Bottom’s men, 
faced with a crisis of masculinity, struggle with their economic position and gender role 
in society. Sula loses her father when young and her grandmother Eva is left with three 
children by her husband. Nel is raised by her mother Helene since her father works as a 
chef for a shipping company and spends most of his time away from home. Morrison’s 
narrative reflects the fact that “African American men have historically been blocked 
from enacting both the traditional African and traditional American mainstream 
gender roles of provider and protector” (Lawrence-Webb, Littlefield and Okundaye 
2004, 628). Receiving little or no protection from their men, black women were forced 
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to exercise self-reliance and take care of their children by themselves. As bell hooks 
suggests in Ain’t I a Woman, African American women were doubly oppressed in the 
patriarchal society of the United States: “Sexism and racism intensified and magnified 
the sufferings and oppressions of black women” (1982, 22). Motherhood was left as the 
only possible institution that could bring power to women, operating as “a symbol of 
power” and “an empowering experience” (Collins 2000, 192-198). However, Morrison 
invents a female character who not only rejects the standard roles of mother and wife but 
also moves beyond the limits of womanhood through an insistence on shaping herself 
differently. And she does so by “posing the radical possibility that women friends could 
and should share male lovers, even in the context of wedlock, [as] an alternative to 
heteronormative romantic love based in [sic] jealous possession” (Fulton 2006, 74). 
Morrison’s narrative is revolutionary in that it portrays a sort of unconventional, open 
morality and considers the possibility of feminine friendship alongside marriage, which 
was radical at the time. In a conversation, Morrison tells Gloria Naylor of how some 
men were “genuinely terrified” of the notion of friendship between women when she 
went to certain places to talk about Sula ([1985] 1994, 200).
Although it can be received as a novel that authentically represents the cultural and 
historical conditions of the period, Sula is not exclusively context-bound or culturally 
specific. According to Joseph McLaren,
Sula […] is not primarily concerned with the social conflict between the white and the 
African American communities of Medallion. The novel mostly concerns the way African 
American communities both include and exclude those members who have violated 
community mores or who have become dislocated in ways that cause them to live on the 
moral or social margins. The novel presents characters who each signify an adaptation to this 
community, a community divided by class. (2010, 5567)
Similarly, as Hortense J. Spillers suggests,
Morrison […] imagines a character whose failings are directly traceable to the absence 
of a discursive/imaginative project—some thing to do, some object-subject relationship 
which establishes the identity in time and space. We do not see Sula in relationship to an 
“oppressor,” a “whitey,” a male, a dominant and dominating being outside the self. No 
Manichean analysis demanding a polarity of interest—black/white, male/female, good/
bad—will work here. Instead, Sula emerges as an embodiment of a metaphysical chaos 
in pursuit of an activity both proper and sufficient to herself. (1999, 54; emphasis in the 
original)
Relying on Alan Bourassa’s critical method in his analysis of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible 
Man (Bourassa 2009), we approach Sula not as a specifically African American text but 
as the expression of a universal human situation/possibility. 
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3. From the Problematic of the Personal
It would not be too implausible to suggest that literature is the scope of problems. After 
all, pure happiness is not so much maintained as wished for in our everyday lives, and 
in our fiction. Even when achieved, happiness proves so elusive, so transitory that one 
begins to doubt if it had existed in the first place. It is not difficult to name a plethora 
of problems faced by the key character of Sula and by Nel, the other key character of 
the novel: from the disillusionment/estrangement that Sula and Nel undergo in their 
relationships with their mothers to the mutual loss of a profound feminine bond. 
In a sense, Morrison portrays in this novel how Sula and Nel struggle from crisis 
to crisis. But this treatment of a problem does not, to us, appeal as a satisfactory 
approach since it misses the complex dynamics of the problematics that we always 
encounter in the act of reading. The character’s problems are always defined in terms 
of personality, experience, identity, emotion—being too confined to the personal. 
Inasmuch as this is true of any novelistic character, we can be certain that it is also 
true of Sula and Nel, whose struggles, encounters and decisions form the entire set 
of crises that comprise the novel. Nevertheless, it is still possible to speak of another 
type of problem, another type of problematic that is encountered by the reader in the 
reading process. And it can only be described as having a curious tactile sensation 
under the skin, a weightless feeling of heaviness, an unnameble set of twists and turns, 
of knots and loops and of thresholds that cannot be directly expressed in the content 
of the story. It is only when these singular points reverberate together that a certain 
problematic begins to reveal itself. 
Here is a key question for us: What is the problematic of Sula, the string of singular 
points that resonate in the story and yet resist easy articulation? One might describe 
it in terms of complexity, ambiguity, oddity or eccentricity. We can equally well use a 
myriad of other words that point to an intensive, unnamable, indefinable quality and 
that contain an element of confusion, undecidability, uncertainty. The problem is thus 
constituted by certain moments of Sula where one feels an overtone of complexity, a 
sense of ambiguity or oddity in comparison to which other moments—however serious 
or vague—seem plain and simple, perhaps the plainness and simplicity by which so 
much personal experience seems to be typified. The problematic moments experienced 
by Sula are numerous: her grandmother Eva’s immolation of her son Plum out of mercy, 
Sula’s slicing off of her own fingertip to ward off harassing white boys, a neighborhood 
boy’s slipping into the river and his subsequent drowning, Sula’s mother Hannah’s 
accidental and fatal burning, Sula’s departure from her hometown and her subsequent 
return, the encounter and exchange of words between Sula and Nel after ten years of 
separation and Sula’s momentary theft of Nel’s husband—among others. There are 
also other key questions for us to ponder: What characterizes these scenes with their 
complexity or ambiguity? Why do these moments form a kind of enclosure, a kind of 
frame for the novel? It is as if, reading Sula, one is in the presence of two novels: one, 
the surface novel or plotline recognizably about characters with a psychology, with 
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emotions, with relationships, with identity; and another novel, at a deeper level, that 
constitutes the texture, the perceptions and affections of Sula. For us to express the real, 
complex workings of this problem, we must ask still another question: What basically 
is a problem? In The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze provides us with an answer by setting 
up the problematic against the event: “The mode of the event is the problematic. One 
must not say that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon 
problems and define their conditions. […] A problem is determined only by the 
singular points which express its conditions. We do not say that the problem is thereby 
resolved; on the contrary, it is determined as a problem” ([1969] 2002, 54).
One might wonder what practical implications there are in Deleuze’s definition, 
with its intensifying complexity, what he assumes a reader can actually do with a 
problem and its conditions. Fortunately, he goes on to clarify the point for us: “[T]he 
question is not that of quantifying or measuring human properties, but rather, on the 
one hand, that of problematizing human events, and, on the other, that of developing as 
various human events the conditions of a problem” (55). For Deleuze, the problematic 
is best conceived of as a network of relations between different points of singularity. The 
act of reading then is constituted not just by one instant, one event of complexity, one 
singularity, but rather by a patchwork of singular points that are strung out along the 
line of the reading. It follows that the problematic can only be articulated when we are 
able to discover not just the points and events, the moments and movements, but the 
relations of singularity that run between them. We have already pointed out in passing 
several moments of complexity that seem to run through Morrison’s narrative. Before 
we proceed to map out the problematic of Sula along a line or spectrum of singular 
points, we must first recognize what the endpoints of this line, the extremities of this 
spectrum are. Between what two points do the points of complexity unfold? It would 
not be off the mark to name them as morality and friendship, the two great forces whose 
perpetual clash and overlap pervade the narrative of Sula. Friendship, when broken, 
propels Sula from man to man for fulfillment in love, which she nonetheless fails to 
reach. It is also the very same force that nourishes attachment and fuels contention 
between Sula and Nel.
A keen reader can realize how one terminus of the problematic, the question of 
morality, is closely connected with a certain sense of ambiguity in the course of the 
novel and in the character of Sula. Morrison unsettles the seemingly primordial dualism 
of good and evil in Sula by animating the relativity of meaning. According to Rachel 
Lee, “Sula broaches the subject not only of semantic integrity (how we can convey what 
we mean) but also of epistemological integrity (how [we can] know anything since 
there is no objective perspective and no objective essence or truth to know)” (1994, 
571). The idea, then, can be evolved to apply to the figure of Sula herself: “How can 
we understand or know Sula, who is not only egoless or without a self (and hence 
undeterminable) but who also is unable to know anything herself?” (571). It is because 
of her doubting, her questioning nature that Sula does not hesitate to give vent to 
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an epistemological antagonism toward Manichean ethics. Once, she challenges Eva’s 
adherence to Christian morality in her judgments of right and wrong, of good and evil:
[Eva] “Bible say honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be long upon the land 
thy God giveth thee.”
[Sula] “Mamma must have skipped that part. Her days wasn’t too long.”
[Eva] “Pus mouth! God’s going to strike you!”
[Sula] “Which God? The one watched you burn Plum?” (Morrison [1973] 2004, 93)
Sula’s question ‘Which God?’ not only undermines Eva’s conception of good and 
evil but also the substantiality of evil in general. We would not be far wrong to claim 
that ambiguity in Sula finds its ultimate expression in the question of (a)morality. In 
this line, Spillers recognizes how Sula’s negation of shallow moral codes allows her to 
escape categorical and simplistic definitions of personality:
Despite our misgivings at Sula’s insistence and at the very degree of alienation Morrison 
accords her, we are prepared to accept her negative, naysaying freedom as a necessary 
declaration of independence […] that leads us as well as the author away from the limited 
repertoire of powerless virtue and sentimental pathos. Sula is neither tragic nor pathetic; she 
does not amuse or accommodate. For black audiences, she is not consciousness of the black 
race personified, nor “tragic mulatto,” nor, for white ones, is she “mammie,” “Negress,” 
“coon,” or “maid.” She is herself. (1999, 54-55)
In a word, the rejection of absolutes and the absence of a moral reference have 
made a very complex, ambiguous, eccentric character out of Sula. The Sula reader 
can also see how the other terminus of the problematic, the question of friendship, 
resounds in the novel with a sense of oddity. Despite the two friends’ childhood 
closeness and companionship, Sula and Nel reach a point of failed understanding in 
their relationship. These two forces—that is, morality and friendship—remain the 
ultimate great incompatibles of Sula. However, it is not possible to claim that they are 
incompatibles unless we add a third term, some assumption, concept or idea that acts 
as a connective, as the glue between the two. It follows that the third term may fail to 
function as a synthesizer, to yield a proper solution. So we begin to conceive of a type 
of false problem, a type of trap we can all too easily fall into. It is precisely by breaking 
into this trap—exploring the central crises of the novel—and by breaking out of it—
working out of the crises—that we as readers can finally manage to articulate the other 
problematic, the complex problematic of singularity. 
Sula opposes the community’s brand of morality with a deeply felt personal 
experience. Throughout the course of the narrative, we frequently encounter a form 
of emotional self-revelation as we follow the shift from fury to terror, to thrill, to 
curiosity, to frustration. Sula’s individualism, her rejection of an exterior ethical 
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principle is reanimated by her introspective contemplation of emotions: “[W]ith 
a twist that was all her own imagination, she lived out her days exploring her own 
thoughts and emotions, giving them full reign, feeling no obligation to please anybody 
unless their pleasure pleased her” (Morrison [1973] 2004, 118). Despite the fact that 
Sula undermines any notion of pure morality, she seeks a pure word to describe the 
feeling, the loneliness she pursues in sexual love. It is the type of loneliness that is 
conceivable or desired without any necessary prior negation of relation to another—a 
form of absence that antedates presence, “a loneliness so profound the word itself had 
no meaning. For loneliness assumed the absence of other people, and the solitude she 
found in that desperate terrain had never admitted the possibility of other people” 
(123). It is no wonder that this ambitious longing for a word that escapes words 
proves nothing but a failure. Sula’s idea of loneliness in a vacuum, then, is not only 
aborted but also replaced by a deeply felt, untraceable nostalgia and supplemented 
by a list of lost items: “She wept then. Tears for the deaths of the littlest things: the 
castaway shoes of children; broken stems of marsh grass battered and drowned by the 
sea; prom photographs of dead women she never knew; wedding rings in pawnshop 
windows; the tidy bodies of Cornish hens in a nest of rice” (123). It is in terms of the 
self/the person that Sula makes her decision to leave Medallion in the wake of Nel’s 
marriage to Jude. She takes the path to urban life, travels from town to town, goes 
to college and allegedly sleeps with white men too—as a gesture of antipathy against 
Nel’s submission to the moral, the matrimonial.
In contrast to Sula, who chooses to revel in her spirit of self-reliance, Nel is morally 
conscious of the codes and conventions of social decorum. In “Sula and the Primacy of 
Woman-to-Woman Bonds,” Stephanie A. Demetrakopoulos traces Nel’s conformism 
back to her mother’s rigidly protective behavior, and to her family history: “Nel’s 
matrilineal line suffers from an Eve/Mary bedrock of feminine duality, the whore/
Madonna polarity. Nel’s mother, Helene, has been carefully taught to hate her own 
mother, Rochelle, an Eve figure, a ‘Creole whore’” ([1987] 1999, 79). Also in contrast 
to Sula’s self-sought loneliness and freewheeling denial of roots, Nel is more of a nest-
making, domestic figure. She marries, bears children and keeps the home fires burning. 
Realizing that “a lover was not a comrade and could never be—for a woman” (Morrison 
[1973] 2004, 121), Sula returns to Medallion after ten years and meets Nel once again. 
The encounter bears testimony to both a metaphorical and a literal distance, an odd 
lack of mutual understanding. It is in terms of the personal that their exchange is 
terminated by Nel’s distracting act of proffering tea:
“You been gone too long, Sula.” 
“Not too long, but maybe too far.” 
“What’s that supposed to mean?” […] 
“Oh, I don’t know.” 
“Want some cool tea?” (96)
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It is in the conflict, the encounter between friendship and morality, the morality 
of the black community that Sula dismisses through her liberated way of life, that the 
emotion, the individuality, the personhood of Sula takes form. Ironically, it is with the 
same kind of awareness—the consciousness of her desires and her friendship—that 
Sula sleeps with her best friend’s husband. Sula’s dismissal and breaching of normative 
morality comes into conflict with Nel’s conception of feminine friendship. Jude leaves 
home and Nel refuses to see Sula for some time. Nel’s emotional response, her deeply 
felt agony and devastation in the face of her husband’s betrayal derives from the fact 
that her womanhood, individuality and vulnerability have been all too available, too 
exposed to Jude:
But Jude […] you knew me. All those days and years, Jude, you knew me. My ways and my 
hands and how my stomach folded and how we tried to get Mickey to nurse and how about 
the time when the landlord said... but you said... and I cried, Jude. You knew me and had 
listened to the things I said at night, and heard me in the bathroom and laughed at my 
raggedy girdle and I laughed too because I knew you too, Jude. So how could you leave me 
when you knew me? (104-105; emphasis in the original)
The question remains unanswered. Apparently, Sula has been acutely conscious of 
her emotions all along. And this certain consciousness reaches its climax when Nel 
finally goes to pay a visit to Sula, who is burning with fever, lying on her deathbed. In 
response to Nel’s implicit denunciation of her wayward lifestyle—“Lonely, ain’t it?” 
(143)—Sula, once again, affirms her desire for absolute loneliness—a state constituted 
by a sense of missing or longing, but without an object: “Yes. But my lonely is mine. 
Now your lonely is somebody else’s. Made by somebody else and handed to you. Ain’t 
that something? A secondhand lonely” (143; emphasis in the original). 
4. Toward the Problematic of Affects
Every problem deserves an appropriate answer. But the problem whose three points 
are morality, emotion and friendship receives no answer whatsoever since it constitutes 
a false one. In this false problematic, morality is represented by the most sordid, 
mechanistic criteria of good and evil, and blinds itself to the complexities of the human 
mind, the nuances of love and friendship and the subtle movements of social life. It sets 
itself up as ethical, but its morality is nothing but a kind of backward stubbornness and 
unquestioning faith in a simplified set of laws, the kind of morality that allows the women 
of Bottom to not worry, to even take it as a compliment that Sula’s mother Hannah has 
casual sex with their husbands as long as she does not possess them, while at the same 
time fretting over Sula’s relationships with white men—“the thing for which there was 
no understanding, no excuse, no compassion. The route from which there was no way 
back, the dirt that could not ever be washed away” (Morrison [1973] 2004, 112).
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Sula’s attempt to compensate for the loss of Nel’s affection and counter the blinkered 
morality of the black community is purely in terms of character or the person, that is, 
based on her personal feelings and experiences. It is a false problem because emotion/
character does not resist the morality to which Sula stands opposed. To anchor oneself 
to the personal is never to counter or escape the instrumentalist morality of a self-
righteous community but only to become its plaything. It is for the very same reason 
that with her decision to return, Sula becomes a pawn to the moral whims of a self-
infatuated community. When a plague of robins accompanies Sula home, the people of 
the town are encouraged to interpret it as a bad omen, as evidence that she is a source 
of evil (89). And Sula confirms the allegation by committing her old grandmother Eva 
to a nursing home, and “the people in the Bottom shook their heads and said Sula was 
a roach” (112). It is only when she is present that the community can attribute random 
occurrences of misfortune to her—such as a child’s falling off of Sula’s porch and a 
man’s accidental choking to death as Sula passes by (113-114). By the same token, 
it is only in Sula’s presence that Nel can identify herself as a “good woman” (138). 
Marked by promiscuity in the eye of a moralist community, Sula serves only as a foil 
for reinforcing the community’s sense of properness. We realize that the personal, the 
deeply felt emotion does not undercut mechanistic morality since it is itself morality’s 
proudest accomplishment. To the false problem of morality-emotion-friendship, 
then, we must provide an alternative, a more effectual problem whose solution is not 
hampered by the conditions of the problem itself. We specify this alternate problem as 
morality-affect-friendship and assume that it exceeds the limits of the individual, the 
inward, the emotional. But how do we reach this desired alternative?
In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari identify the three creative dimensions 
of thought that compose the human subject, namely, philosophy, science and art. 
Whereas “philosophy extracts concepts [...], science extracts prospects [...] and art extracts 
percepts and affects” ([1991] 1994, 24; emphasis in the original). These distinct means 
forming human existence make possible the production of new modes of conceiving, 
observing and feeling/perceiving. As Claire Colebrook stresses in her book Gilles 
Deleuze, “[c]oncepts are not labels or names that we attach to things; they produce an 
orientation or a direction for thinking” (2002, 15-16). A concept, then, is never meant 
to simply add one more word to a language or increase life quantitatively. Likewise, 
the material of art—and of literature for that matter—is to be treated not as a function 
of representation but as a means of intensive, differential production. If the task of 
philosophy is to produce new concepts that move us and our language away from the 
fixity of prefabricated clichés and commonsensical opinions, art is meant to produce 
new affects and percepts that furnish us with the possibility of moving beyond personal 
feelings and simplistic generalizations. In a sense, affects both comprise and are essential 
to art. In the words of John Hughes, “the work of art preserves a being of sensation 
as ‘a compound of percepts and affects’ independent […] of the lived perceptions and 
affections of the artist or his or her viewer or reader. Once again, not the perception—
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what one sees—but the percept as the virtual event of a becoming by which newly 
constituted relations of things and self are given to be seen” (1997, 71). In the same 
vein, Brian Massumi contrasts affect as intensity with feeling as personal emotion:
affect/affection. Neither word denotes a personal feeling (sentiment in Deleuze and 
Guattari). L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal 
intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and 
implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s 
affection) is each such state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a 
second, affecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include “mental” 
or ideal bodies). (1987, xvii; emphasis in the original)
Massumi’s notion of affect is a dynamic force, with the potential or capacity to 
‘affect’ and ‘be affected,’ to expand and retract, and to constitute change, transition, 
transmutation in the event of an encounter. In a conversation with Mary Zournazi, 
Massumi addresses emotion as simply one narrow fragment, one actual state of a 
wider range of virtual possibilities and potentialities: “[A]n emotion is a very partial 
expression of affect. It only draws on a limited selection of memories and only activates 
certain reflexes or tendencies” (Zournazi 2002, 213). Also, in “Literature, Character, 
and the Human,” Bourassa separates affect from emotion, from the simply human:
[A]lthough affect is often used interchangeably with emotion, we can see that affect goes 
beyond the realm of emotion. It is more accurate to say that emotion is a branch of affect. 
Emotion is one way of marking an impingement of one force upon another—the potentiality 
of human judgment brought together with a particular experience, leading to a particular 
feeling. But an action is also an affect, a perception is an affect, a composite of perception, 
feeling, movement can be an affect. (2009, 26)
We thus see that affects are not merely the preserve of personal experiences and felt 
emotions, but put us in touch with the far greater source of all potentials, the relations 
of force. In fact, affects are prepersonal intensities that form human beings, but are 
not limited to the human. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us, there is something 
nonhuman, virtual, intense to every affect: “Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings 
whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in 
the absence of man because man […] is himself a compound of percepts and affects” 
([1991] 1994, 164; emphasis in the original).
If the problem of Morrison’s Sula is the conjuncture of morality-affect-friendship, 
our main task is to directly address the complexity, the specificity of affect. What 
affective movements inform Sula? How do they constitute prepersonal intensities/
haecceities? And how do these affects relate to the endpoints of morality and 
friendship? After all, we cannot reconcile ourselves with a friendship that is only 
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personal and a morality that is only mechanistic. In this line, we will focus on two 
affective mo(ve)ments in Sula: what we will call the affective mo(ve)ment of sensation 
and the epiphanic reconfiguration of morality and friendship. Sula and Nel experience 
moments of sensation that, despite bearing an emotional charge, cannot be reduced to 
any single emotional component. The three most important mo(ve)ments of affective 
sensation occur (1) when Sula overhears her mother’s statement about not liking 
her just as Nel is similarly disappointed with her mother for not reacting to racial 
humiliation (fury/disappointment), (2) when Sula swings a neighborhood boy around 
and accidentally throws him into the river, leading to his drowning (fear/terror), 
and (3) when Sula watches her mother Hannah burn to death and does nothing to 
save her (thrill). These three mo(ve)ments constitute intense instances of crossing 
well-defined thresholds of the personal, the individual. In all three mo(ve)ments, 
the characters are pushed into a sensation at the very moment that they are least 
expecting it. 
The summer of her twelfth year, Sula has one of her first experiences of fury/
disappointment as she overhears Hannah’s conversing with friends. While the others do 
not admit that the difficulties associated with raising children have negatively affected 
their maternal love, Hannah does so unapologetically. She tells one of her friends, “You 
love [your child], like I love Sula. I just don’t like her. That’s the difference” (Morrison 
[1973] 2004, 57). Shocked by the reality of her mother’s detachment from her, Sula 
rushes up the stairs—where she stays for some time “in bewilderment,” painfully “aware 
of a sting in her eye” (57). After this critical event in Sula’s childhood, there seems to 
be little hope that her relationship with Hannah will ever fully recover. According to 
Elizabeth Ann Beaulieu, Sula’s emotional disconnection from her mother leaves her 
emptied, without a center: “When women deny their mothers in Morrison’s novels, 
as they often do, the result is a loss of self or center” (2003, 116). Despite its initially 
devastating impact, the realization—that her mother does not like her—plays a crucial 
role in Sula’s future character development. In much the same manner, Nel experiences 
estrangement as she accompanies her mother Helene on a trip to New Orleans to see her 
ailing grandmother. Helene walks through the white only compartment of a passenger 
car and is harshly reprimanded by the conductor. In response to the humiliation, she 
does nothing but “[smile] dazzlingly and coquettishly” (Morrison [1973] 2004, 21). 
Nel is disillusioned with the image of her mother as a strong and right-minded woman 
and decides to never follow in her quietism, and instead to “always be on her guard” 
against it: “If this tall, proud woman, this woman who was very particular about her 
friends, who slipped into church with unequaled elegance, who could quell a roustabout 
with a look, if she were really custard, then there was a chance that Nel was too” (22). 
Following their separate experiences of disappointment with their mothers, Sula and 
Nel try to compensate for this lost sense of belonging in one another’s company where 
they can “afford to abandon the ways of other people and concentrate on their own 
perceptions of things” (55).
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Sula and Nel are to experience still another surge of sensation while playing 
together on the river bank, uprooting grass and digging holes. Later when Chicken 
Little, a small boy from the neighborhood, joins the two of them, Sula tries to give 
him a swing: “Sula picked him up by his hands and swung him outward then around 
and around. His knickers ballooned and his shrieks of frightened joy startled the birds 
and the fat grasshoppers. When he slipped from her hands and sailed away out over 
the water they could still hear his bubbly laughter” (60-61). Overcome by terror and 
still expecting him to “come back up, laughing,” the two girls “[stare] at the water” 
in a state of disbelief and helplessness (61). As the expectation of his resurfacing 
gradually diminishes, Nel realizes that Shadrack, the town’s shell-shocked veteran of 
World War I, has witnessed the scene. Sula runs to his cottage in mixed terror and 
embarrassment to ensure that he will not tell. Even before she finds the courage to 
ask the question, Shadrack nods his head and mysteriously answers, “Always” (62). 
Interpreting this as a promise, Sula rushes “back to Nel and the dark closed place in 
the water,” where she bursts into tears and is consoled by Nel (62). Secrecy consigns 
Sula and Nel to their interiority and develops into isolation, “a space, a separateness, 
between them” (64).
Sula’s perception of terror in response to Chicken Little’s death is in contrast to 
a completely different sensation in the dramatic scene that occurs shortly afterward. 
Hannah accidentally sets herself on fire while lighting a fire in the yard. Realizing that 
her daughter is burning, Eva throws herself out of the top floor window in an attempt 
to smother the flames, but miscalculates and comes “crashing down some twelve feet 
from Hannah’s smoke” (76). Hannah runs out into the street where the neighbors 
throw water on her and put out the flames, but she is severely injured and dies during 
the transfer to the hospital. Eva is also taken to the hospital where she muses over 
the events of that day and remembers that as she was on the ground, reaching for 
Hannah, Sula was standing on the back porch, watching her mother burn without 
doing anything to help her. When Eva mentions this to a few friends, they insist that it 
was probably because Sula was too shocked to react. However, Eva remains “convinced 
that Sula had watched Hannah burn not because she was paralyzed, but because she was 
interested” (78). In retrospect, Sula reflects on her uncanny passivity and detachment, 
her voyeuristic fascination and thrill in watching the horrific spectacle of her mother on 
fire: “I didn’t mean anything. I never meant anything. I stood there watching her burn 
and was thrilled. I wanted her to keep on jerking like that, to keep on dancing” (147).
The novel provides us with two potential explanations for Sula’s anti-passionate 
coolness. In the first, the narrator diagnoses Sula with a basic lack of egoism: “She was 
completely free of ambition, with no affection for money, property or things, no greed, 
no desire to command attention or compliments—no ego. For that reason she felt 
no compulsion to verify herself—be consistent with herself” (119). In the other, the 
narrator reveals that Sula’s eccentricity, curiosity and frustration are all the result of a 
creative imagination that has no medium, no object:
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In a way her strangeness, her naiveté, her craving for the other half of her equation was 
the consequence of an idle imagination. Had she paints, or clay, or knew the discipline of 
the dance or strings; had she anything to engage her tremendous curiosity and her gift for 
metaphor, she might have exchanged the restlessness and preoccupation with whim for an 
activity that provided her with all she yearned for. And like any artist with no art form she 
became dangerous. (121)
A still more credible analysis would be to posit that Sula, in going her own way, 
in making her own decisions, captures and hypostatizes her affects. In the words of 
Spillers, “[w]hatever Sula has become, whatever she is, is a matter of her own choices, 
[however] ill-formed and ill-informed” (1999, 54). And it is this uninhibited openness 
to possibilities that produces an aura of distinction around the character of Sula. Her 
adoption/affirmation of these affects is so successful, in fact, that she lives in the realm of 
the actual and the real. Sula’s ethical/aesthetic philosophy captures for her the dangers 
of the affective, the intense. Whereas Sula is a woman of her own making, Nel—at 
least initially—cannot actualize the affects that comprise her. Morrison characterizes 
Nel as a psychologically inhibited and unimaginative figure in that her obsessive/
repressive mother has driven “her daughter’s imagination underground” (18). Nel’s 
unarticulated belief that she cannot simultaneously experience heterosexual love and 
feminine friendship deprives her of both Sula’s company and Jude’s love. She hesitates 
to create a morality of her own, and instead remains complaisant and plays the good 
daughter of the community. Morrison complicates the problem further by suggesting 
in a conversation with Robert B. Stepto that Sula and Nel can be taken as “two sides of 
the same person, or two sides of one extraordinary character” (1979, 216). While the 
novel begins with and for the most part centers on Sula, it is ultimately Nel’s.
It is not until her second reunion with Sula that Nel begins to form an affective 
friendship that will run counter to her personal sense of love and the abstract morality 
of the black community. We can see the first hints of Nel’s transformation, her gradual 
self-recognition, in her decision to go and visit her dying friend despite all that has 
gone between them. In this reunion, Sula undermines—even reverses—Nel’s delusion 
that her own actions are driven by virtue, that she is morally superior to Sula:
“How you know?” Sula asked.
“Know what?” Nel still wouldn’t look at her.
“About who was good. How you know it was you?”
“What you mean?”
“I mean maybe it wasn’t you. Maybe it was me.” (Morrison [1973] 2004, 146)
Nel leaves in silence, closing the door behind her. It is still not clear that the challenge 
to Nel’s conception of virtue has taken effect. And it is still not possible to determine 
that her perceptions are transmuting into affective awareness, the consciousness of 
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sensations, of energies, of flows. The undermining of Nel’s mental framework is only 
a negative byproduct of the new kind of perception, the truly materialistic awareness 
that is about to be formed. What is more, friendship, attachment, closeness and love are 
not a matter of emotion. One does not just have an emotional sense of friendship; one 
does not simply feel forgotten, unloved, overlooked, betrayed. According to Bourassa,
[t]he feelings themselves are only offshoots of a larger affective condition, and because the 
condition is affective rather than emotional, it preexists the evaluations we or the character 
might place upon it, and so mutates as it undergoes its own history. It is not bound to any 
emotional or moral evaluation, so love, as affect, can migrate from ethical situation to ethical 
situation. (2009, 69-70)
Sometime later, Nel goes to pay a call on Eva who is left by Sula at Sunnydale, 
a home for the aged. In the middle of a disjointed conversation, Eva surprises Nel 
by inquiring how she killed Chicken Little. As Nel tries to disambiguate that it 
was Sula who threw the little boy in the river, Eva challenges her innocence: “You. 
Sula. What’s the difference? You was there. You watched, didn’t you?” (Morrison 
[1973] 2004, 168). Eva’s vision that Sula and Nel are one and the same—“just 
alike” (169)—begins to haunt Nel. She remembers the good feeling, the feeling of 
enjoyment and contentment, when Chicken’s hands slipped from Sula’s, and when 
water finally closed over the place where he sank. Nel ultimately recognizes her own 
guilt, her moral failure, but her friendship is not separate from the moral valuation 
she places upon it. Nel’s appropriation/appreciation of her friendship as a potential, 
a force, an affect becomes possible as soon as her prejudices, her misrecognitions 
fall away. When she can take Sula’s love upon herself, it becomes a question, not 
of feeling, but of movement, of relation, and it is in this movement that she finds 
not only a world she has never before seen, not only the meaning of love, but the 
ethics that has escaped her all along, even in her greatest commitment to the catholic 
morality of the black community. Nel gradually walks into this unsettling world 
of possibility, and although it is impossible to go back and fix things with Sula, 
just as she is still within the stark confines of the black community’s morality, she 
is about to experience a pure affective movement, one that enables her to perceive 
the difference between a true friendship and a self-centered, self-righteous, self-
indulgent relationship. It is but a short step before she falls into her new awareness. 
The moment of this change is to come shortly after Nel visits the colored part of 
the cemetery at Beechnut Park where Sula is buried alongside other members of the 
Peace family. After Nel accidentally encounters Shadrack as she is leaving—“and it is 
in the accident that we see the greatest workings of affect, in the chance encounter, 
the fall one takes into one’s future [or past]” (Bourassa 2009, 70)—she begins to 
see what she has missed. Nel realizes that her deepest attachment to another human 
being was to Sula, not to Jude, nor to any man whatsoever.
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All that time, all that time, I thought I was missing Jude.” And the loss pressed down on her 
chest and came up into her throat. “We was girls together,” she said as though explaining 
something. “O Lord, Sula,” she cried, “girl, girl, girlgirlgirl.” It was a fine cry—loud and 
long—but it had no bottom and it had no top, just circles and circles of sorrow. (Morrison 
[1973] 2004, 174)
It is so often the case that emotions follow events immediately whereas affects, 
being complex, accumulative and singular, form over time. As Barbara Johnson puts it:
The dissociation of affect and event is one of Morrison’s most striking literary techniques in 
this novel, both in her narrative voice (in which things like infanticide are not exclaimed 
over) and in the emotional lives of her characters. The most important example of affective 
discontinuity is Nel’s reaction to the discovery of Jude, her husband, naked on the floor with 
Sula, her best friend. She tries to howl in pain but cannot do so until seventy pages later 
when she realizes that she mourns the loss of Sula rather than Jude. ([1993] 2008, 168)
We seem to have finally captured the movement by which Nel achieves the 
realization to articulate the problem of morality-affect-friendship more thoroughly. In 
the false problem of morality-emotion-friendship, we have observed that a third term—
here, emotion—intervenes between the two endpoints of morality and friendship only 
to hamper the possibility of reaching true awareness. Emotion, as a medium between 
friendship and morality, reduces morality to nothing more than a set of mechanical laws, 
and friendship to nothing more than personal feeling, a synthesis that fails to challenge 
catholic morality and is in fact itself appropriated by it. We can always restructure 
this problem to attain a more workable synthesis by replacing emotion with affect. A 
change in one dimension of the problem changes the problematic altogether because, 
as posited by Bourassa, “the problem is a continuous multiplicity that depends upon 
the relationship, the differential relationship, of all of its terms” (2009, 71). The new 
problematic that we come to, then, is the problematic of morality-affect-friendship, the 
two endpoints of which relate to one another with more clarity, more vigor. Morality 
is no longer the scope of blind mechanisms but of virtual potentialities, of forces, 
intensities and haecceities that open up endless possibilities for transmutation. Sula’s 
morality, which ultimately becomes Nel’s realization/epiphany, is a morality without 
boundaries, one that neither fixates nor is fixated. Friendship, in its turn, operates as 
a catalyst of perception, of sensation, so that when it comes in touch with morality, 
it does not collapse into some passive personal interiority, but rather alters morality 
into an intensive flow that is constantly in the process of formation, deformation and 
reformation. It is essential for us to note that affect is precisely what keeps friendship 
from the danger of fixation. Friendship is not a thing, not a concrete object that 
demands to be felt, but is rather a question of prepersonal intensities, relations and 
movements. By the end of the novel, Nel has moved from a closed world of binary 
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morality and of possessive love into a world of affective recognition. When she emerges 
from her inwardness, she will know where the fault lines/lines of flight are and what 
transformations are just beneath the threshold of existence.
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